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Abstract: Foreign direct investment has been considered for a long time as an important 
channel for transfer of technology to developing countries, and an important tool to generate 
jobs in those countries. Multinationals bring the factor that developing countries need most, 
capital, and therefore, they may also help to ease the unemployment pressure created by a 
rapidly growing (urban) population. It is shown by many researchers that foreign 
establishments are much more productive than domestic firms, but the empirical evidence 
regarding technology spillovers is not unambiguous. In this paper, we suggest that the impact 
of foreign direct investment on local industry hinges on the dynamics of foreign and domestic 
establishments, i.e., entry, selection (exit), and growth processes. Our analysis on foreign and 
domestic establishments in Turkish manufacturing industry for the period 1983-96 indicates 
that foreign establishments have a better performance level than domestic ones when they are 
first established in the local market, and have a higher survival probability. However, when 
the establishment characteristics are controlled for, domestic establishments have the same 
survival probability, but achieve lower rates of employment growth in the early post-entry 
period.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The post-war period saw a rapid increase in international economic activities and, most 
importantly, in foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries. The rise in FDI has 
attracted the attention of industrial and developments economists especially since the late 
1960s. FDI has been considered by many development economists as an important channel 
for transfer of technology to developing countries, and an important tool to generate jobs in 
those countries. It is suggested that modern, advanced technologies introduced by 
multinational firms diffuse to domestic firms through spillovers (imitation, demonstration 
effects, training local labor, vertical technology transfers, etc.). As a result of technology 
spillovers and competitive pressures, the productivity and international competitiveness of 
domestic firms could be enhanced. Moreover, multinationals bring the factor that developing 
countries need most, capital, and therefore, they may also help to ease the unemployment 
pressure created by a rapidly growing (urban) population. 
 
This literature is focused mainly on two topics: the determinants of FDI, and the impact of 
foreign firms on local industry. The researchers that established firmly the field (for example 
Vernon, 1966; Caves, 1974; Dunning, 1977) suggested that there are various (in some cases 
substitute) ways available for a (multinational) firm to serve foreign markets: FDI, exports, 
and licensing. The choice between FDI and other alternatives depends on a number of firm 
(ownership), location and internalization advantages. As Markusen and Maskus (2000) show 
neatly, the multinational firms’ investment behavior can be captured in a “knowledge capital” 
model. The multinational firm who has a technological superiority may prefer FDI over other 
alternatives to prevent the dissipation of knowledge based assets. Thus, multinational firms 
are expected to have a technological advantage over domestic firms because they would not 
go abroad where they are less familiar with market conditions.
1 
  
There are various empirical studies that document technological superiority of foreign over 
domestic firms in a number of developing countries. This is indeed the case even in developed 
countries. For example, using plant level US data, Doms and Jensen (1998), and Blonigen and 
Tomlin (2001) show that there are substantial size and/or labor productivity differences 
between US-owned and foreign plants.  Griffith (1999), Griffith and Simpson (2001) and 
                                                 
1  For comprehensive surveys on the role of FDI and trade in technology transfer and spillovers, see Markusen 
(1998 and 2000), Blomström and Kokko (1998 and 2001), Saggi (2000), and Keller (2001).   2 
Harris and Robinson (2001) observe similar differences for Canada and Britain/UK, 
respectively. Although productivity differences between foreign and domestic plants could be 
explained by other factors like plant size, capital intensity, etc., it is one of the most robust 
empirical finding on FDI. 
 
The pertinent question for policy purposes is the effects of FDI on domestic industry and 
firms because the technological superiority of foreign firms per se does not necessarily imply 
any benefit for the host economy. Therefore, researchers search for spillovers from foreign to 
domestic firms. Early studies using industry-level data almost unanimously found a positive 
correlation between the presence of FDI (usually measured by the share of foreign firms) and 
industry (labor) productivity (see, for example, Caves, 1974; Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999, 
Liu et al., 2000). However, industry-level studies may suffer from some specification 
problems, including the endogeneity bias, i.e., the positive correlation may also arise if 
technologically advanced/ productive sectors are more attractive for foreign investment. 
 
Thanks to the availability of longitudinal firm/plant data, recent studies explore spillovers at 
the firm/plant level. In an early study using plant level data, Haddad and Harrison (1993) find 
in Morocco that there was a level effect of FDI on the total factor productivity (TFP) of 
domestic firms, but not a growth effect. Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Djankov and 
Hoekman (2000) find even negative effects of FDI on the productivity of domestic firms in 
Venezuelan and Czech industries, respectively, whereas Kinoshita (2001) suggests that 
technology spillovers from FDI occur in Czech manufacturing industries for firms that are 
R&D intensive. Blomström and Sjöholm (1999) find positive spillovers in Indonesia, but the 
degree of foreign ownership does not affect the degree of spillovers. Kokko, Tansini and 
Zejan (2001) find in the case of Uruguay that spillovers (positive impact on labor productivity 
of local firms) emanate only from older import-substituting multinational firms that were 
established before 1973. The presence of spillovers is also an issue for developed countries. In 
a recent study on Japanese FDI in the US, Branstetter (2000) find evidence that FDI increases 
the flow of knowledge spillovers both from and to the investing Japanese firms. 
 
Since spillovers from FDI can also be observed in higher wages, many researchers have 
analyzed the effect of the presence of foreign-owned firms on wages, see, for example, 
Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey (1996) for Mexico, Venezuela, and the US; Figlio and Blonigen 
(1999) for the US; and Lipsey and Sjoholm (2001) for Indonesia. A robust finding of these   3 
studies is the stylized fact that foreign firms pay a higher wage, but the effect on wages paid 
by domestic firms is not strong.
2 
 
To summarize, although foreign firms are larger, more productive and more capital and skill 
intensive than their domestic counterparts in both developed and developing countries, their 
effects on domestic firms and the strength of spillovers are not unambiguous. The findings of 
empirical studies lead researchers to conclude that the characteristics of the host country’s 
industry and policy environment (Blomström and Kokko, 1998), the level of human capital 
stock (Borensztein, Gregorio and Lee, 1995; Noorbaksh, Paloni and Youssef, 2001), and 




Although the current literature on FDI provides valuable information on multinational firms 
and their effects on host economies, most available evidence in this field has to do with 
multinationals’ and host countries’ (static) characteristics rather than the dynamics of 
competition. However, we believe that the dynamics of competition is indeed the missing link 
crucial for our understanding of the interactions between foreign and domestic firms, and, 
hence, the effects of FDI on the host economy. For example, the presence of FDI may 
increase productivity of domestic firms through spillovers, and/or by exerting competitive 
pressure on local firms, and forcing them to be more productive (Blomström and Kokko, 
1998). Therefore, the existence of a positive correlation between the presence of FDI and 
higher productivity, as found in some studies, does not necessarily imply the existence of 
spillovers from foreign to domestic firms. In a similar way, the superiority of multinationals 
in terms of size, productivity, wages, export orientation, etc., cannot be explained by the 
argument that “to become a viable multinational a firm must have outperformed domestic and 
foreign rivals in some dimension” (Hanson, 2001), because there is not much evidence that 
proves that multinationals are more viable than domestic firms. The evidence provided on the 
superiority of foreign firms does not indicate i) if it merely reflects superior entry 
characteristics of foreign firms that they first secured in their home markets, or ii) if it is 
accomplished by a learning process in the host economy, or iii) if it is a simple outcome of 
the competitive processes that rapidly eliminate inefficient foreign firms that have lower exit 
                                                 
2  There is also a growing literature on export spillovers generated by FDI. See, for example, Aitken, Hanson and 
Harrison (1997) and references therein.  
3  Although the evidence on positive spillovers from FDI is weak, many developing country governments have 
adopted FDI promotion policies (for policy issues, see Markusen, 1998; Hanson, 2001).   4 
costs that domestic firms. Moreover, the effect of FDI on domestic firms cannot be well-
understood without any information on how foreign firms are established, and how they 
survive and grow, because their impact on domestic firms is determined by these competitive 
processes they are surrounded with.  
 
The aim of this paper is then three-fold: to analyze i) differences in entry characteristics of 
foreign and local firms, ii) differences in post-entry performances of foreign and domestic 
firms, and iii) differences in learning behaviors (active and/or passive) of foreign and 
domestic firms in Turkish manufacturing industries. We hope that the analysis of the 
competition process will enhance our understanding of the exact nature of the relation 
between foreign firms and the host economies. 
 
This paper contributes the existing literature by presenting new evidence on entry, exit, and 
growth patterns of domestic and foreign establishments in the context of Turkish 
manufacturing industries. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 formulates 
the hypotheses to be tested in this paper. Section 3 describes policy framework and inward-
FDI flows in Turkey since 1980. A descriptive analysis of entry-level characteristics and 
survival rates of foreign and domestic plants in Turkish manufacturing industries is presented 
in the same section. The estimation results of an econometric analysis of survival and growth 
processes are discussed in Section 4. Major findings and policy implications are summarized 
in Section 5. 
 
 
2. Dynamics of firms and ownership: Hypotheses 
 
Although research on the dynamics of firms has a long tradition that dates back even to the 
classical economists, the increased availability of panel data on firms/establishments in the 
last couple of decades has sparked a large number of both empirical and theoretical studies on 
this topic. Most of these studies are influenced to a large extent by the path-breaking 
theoretical analyses, among others, of Nelson and Winter (1982), Jovanovic (1982), 
Hopenhayn (1992), and Ericson and Pakes (1995) who emphasize the importance of 
uncertainty and learning. The empirical work on the determinants and effects of entry, exit, 
and growth processes has provided a great deal of “stylized facts” which are observed in   5 
many countries and/or sectors. Since it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss all these 
studies (for comprehensive surveys, see Geroski, 1995; Sutton, 1997; Caves, 1998), we will 
briefly summarize the main findings to formulate some hypotheses on differences between the 
dynamics of domestic and foreign firms. 
 
One of the strongest findings about the entry process is the stylized fact that it is common, 
observed in all countries and sectors. Moreover, entrants start small: new firms are usually 
smaller than incumbents when they start. This also implies that entrants start out their life 
with a relatively low level of investment even if economies of scale are important. This 
phenomenon can be explained by two factors. First, as emphasized in learning models and 
real options theory, entry process is surrounded with uncertainty: entrepreneurs may not  
exactly know how well they will perform in the market. It may be rational to start out small to 
limit sunk commitments even if it imposes a cost penalty, and tend to invest more and grow 
after gathering information on its (potential) performance. Second, new firms may start out 
small because of (capital) market imperfections. Even a confident entrepreneur may start out 
with a small firm if asymmetric information and capital market imperfections make it difficult 
to raise capital (the liquidity constraint).  
 
If uncertainty and capital market imperfections are important, then one may expect 
differences between entry characteristics of single plant and multi plant firms because, a multi 
plant firm is likely to have better information on its capabilities, and, as an established firm, to 
have less problems in raising capital for its new investment. Empirical studies, indeed, 
provide strong evidence for this hypothesis. For example, Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson 
(1988) show that the initial size of multi plant entrants (diversifying firm) is much higher than 
that of single plant entrants. A similar effect could be expected for domestic and foreign 
firms. Foreign firms are mostly multi plant firms that diversify into a different (geographical) 
market. Therefore, uncertainty arising from establishing a new establishment will be less 
severe for a foreign firm that produces the same product. Moreover, an established, 
multinational firm can have adequate internal and external funds to finance new investment 
because they may have a better reputation with financial institutions. Thus, the first 
hypothesis can be formulated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Initial (entry) size of foreign establishments is larger than that of domestic 
establishments.   6 
 
Most new entrants are small and they never overcome the competitive pressures: entrants 
suffer from high mortality rate, and there seems to be a strong positive correlation between 
entry size and the survival probability. However, as in many other aspects of firm dynamics, 
the literature does not offer much about the impact of (foreign) ownership on survival 
probability. On the one hand, it is suggested that foreign firms are “footloose”, because they 
can easily re-allocate their resources to other countries as a reaction to adverse changes in the 
host country (Gibson and Harris, 1996; Görg and Strobl, 2001b). In other words, foreign firms 
may have lower exit cost that makes exit probability higher. On the other hand, foreign firms 
on average may have superior technological and managerial skills that enable them to develop 
successful entry strategies. Therefore, self-selection before entry may increase the survival 
probability of foreign firms. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Foreign establishments will have lower survival probability if they are 
footloose, or higher survival probability if they have better pre-entry assessment of the market 
conditions.  
 
There are a large number of studies that analyze the factors that determine the survival 
probability of foreign firms (for example, see Li, 1995; Barkema, Bell and Pennings, 1996; 
Shaver, Mitchell and Yeung, 1997; Yamawaki, 1997 and 1999; McCloughan and Stone, 
1998; Pan and Chi, 1999; Delios and Beamish, 2001). These studies usually use binominal 
explanatory variables (survived/exited), and test the effects of entry mode (new 
plants/acquisition), degree of foreign ownership (joint venture/wholly owned), and other 
factors on survival probability. The main shortcoming of these studies is the lack of 
comparable data on domestic establishments because they use data on only foreign 
firms/subsidiaries. Therefore, they do not directly compare survival patterns of foreign and 
domestic establishments. 
 
There are only a few studies that use panel data on both domestic and foreign establishments, 
and the findings are ambiguous. For example, Gibson and Harris (1996) have found that 
foreign firms are less likely to exit in New Zealand manufacturing industry, whereas Görg and 
Strobl (2001b) had an opposite result: foreign firms are more likely to exit in Irish 
manufacturing. Similarly, Girma and Görg (2001) have found that the acquisition of a 
domestic establishment by a foreign owner reduces its survival probability. Mata and Portugal   7 
(2002) have found in Portugal that domestic and foreign firms do not exhibit different 
survival probabilities. 
 
Active learning models suggest that post-entry performance has a very significant impact on 
survival probability. An establishment that is not currently profitable (as a result of small 
initial size and/or low initial productivity) may continue to operate in the market if it has 
better prospects in the future. Therefore, a high growth establishment may have a higher 
survival probability. This learning effect could be equally important for both domestic and 
foreign establishments. Hence, 
 
Hypothesis 3. Active learning (as measured by employment growth rates) has the same effect 
on survival probability of domestic and foreign establishments. 
 
The presence of foreign establishments will change competitive conditions in the market. 
Foreign establishments are likely to intensify competition, and may force domestic 
establishments go out of the market (Caves, 1974; Blomström and Sjöholm, 1998). This has, 
of course, efficiency improving effect because the least efficient domestic establishments tend 
to exit first. However, domestic firms may benefit from spillovers from foreign 
establishments, and become more competitive in domestic and, more importantly, in 
international markets. If the spillover effect is dominant, then the survival probability of 
domestic firms will be enhanced by the presence of foreign firms in the same market. The net 
effect of foreign firms on domestic establishments’ survival depends on the host country’s 
policy environment, and the technological capacity of domestic firms. For example, Agosin 
and Mayer (2000) has found that there has been a strong crowding in of domestic investment 
by FDI in Asia, but strong crowding out has been the norm in Latin America. Görg and Strobl 
(2001a) have found in Ireland that the presence of foreign firms has a life enhancing effect on 
domestic establishments in high technology sectors only. In our context, we expect that the 
competitive effect will be dominant because domestic firms’ R&D expenditures are very low.  
 
Hypothesis 4. The foreign presence will reduce domestic establishments’ survival probability. 
  
The presence of foreign firms will change competitive conditions not only for domestic 
establishments but for other foreign establishments as well. It is suggested that foreign 
presence may generate positive information externalities for foreign entrants. Shaver, Mitchell   8 
and Yeung (1997) suggest that foreign firms will be more likely to survive the greater the 
foreign presence in the target industry if the entrant has an experience in another industry in 
the host country. Our data do not allow us to identify the presence of a firm in different 
industries. Therefore, we formulate the hypothesis in a weaker form. 
 
Hypothesis 5. The foreign presence may enhance foreign establishments’ survival probability. 
 
“Gibrat’s Law” is one of the most influential and controversial argument on firm growth. It 
states that growth rates of firms are independent of their sizes. The original formulation of 
Gibrat’s Law ignores the processes of entry and exit, and their impact on firm growth. 
However, empirical studies provide ample evidence that although the survival rate of entrants 
is low, those who survive achieve very high growth rates, leading to a negative correlation 
between size and growth among surviving firms (for early studies, see Evans, 1987 a and 
1987b; Hall, 1987. For a recent study on the growth rate of Japanese manufacturing plants in 
the US, see Blonigen and Tomlin, 2001). This finding is consistent with learning and real 
options theory. If new firms start at small scale because they are uncertain about their ability 
and/or they lack resources, those who prove to be efficient and profitable will survive, 
establish a reputation, and grow faster by investing internal resources or by lending. If this is 
the case, then the current size of the establishment will be negatively correlated with the 
current growth rate. This negative correlation, however, will be less significant for foreign 
establishments because the uncertainty and liquidity constraints are less severe for foreign 
than domestic firms.  
 
Hypothesis 6. The impact of the current size on growth rate will be smaller for foreign 
establishments. 
 
Although foreign firms may own superior technological and managerial expertise, they 
operate in a different environment, and face different types of learning challenges. As they 
operate in the domestic market, they gradually increase their output if they are more efficient. 
Thus, independent of its current size, foreign establishments tend to grow faster than domestic 
establishments. 
 
Hypothesis 7. Foreign establishments have higher growth rate than domestic establishments. 
   9 
These hypotheses summarize the expected behavioral differences between domestic and 
foreign establishments in Turkish manufacturing industries. After a brief description of policy 
environment and FDI flows in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s in the following section, we 
will test these hypotheses by using establishment level panel data for Turkish manufacturing 
industries for the period 1983 to 1996 (sections 3 and 4). 
 
 
3. Foreign direct investment in Turkey 
 
The first legislation in Turkey governing the foreign investments was introduced in the early 
1950s. The Foreign Capital Law which was enacted in 1954 and the related Decree of the 
Council of Ministers had remained in force since the late 1980s. The Law and the Decree 
provided a quite liberal framework of general principles designed to create a favorable 
environment for FDI. However, it is suggested by some researchers that the government 
institutions, and most importantly the State Planning Organization, who were suspicious of 
foreign capital, had effectively kept inward foreign investment at low levels with various 
restrictive bureaucratic practices (Erdilek, 1982). Thus, the cumulative total of FDI authorized 
from 1950 to 1980 had reached only 229 million USD (Öniş, 1994).  
 
The import substitution industrialization strategy followed by the Turkish governments in the 
1960s and 1970s had to be abandoned as a result of a severe balance of payments crisis in the 
late 1970s. On January 24, 1980, the Turkish government announced a stabilization program 
that was fully implemented under the military regime after September 1980. The new 
program was based on outward-oriented trade strategy and foreign trade, product, and, later, 
capital markets have been liberalized to a large extent (for a comprehensive overview of the 
Turkish economy, see Kepenek and Tentürk, 2000).  
 
The administrative system regulating FDI was reorganized in the early 1980s to simplify 
investment procedures and to eliminate ambiguities arising from the fragmented bureaucratic 
structure. Moreover, all discriminatory treatment foreign investor were subject to and 
conditions on local equity participation were gradually eliminated (Erdilek, 1986; Akpınar, 
2001). The complete liberalization of capital accounts in 1989 provided an additional impetus 
for foreign investment. As a result, the number of firms with foreign participation increased   10 
from 78 in 1980 to 1,856 in 1990 and to 5,328 in 2000, whereas total value of inflow of FDI 
reached 2.6 billion USD in the 1980-89 period and 11.8 billion USD in the 1990-2000 
period.
4 The manufacturing industry alone accounted for 55% of cumulative authorized FDI 
in the post-1980 period.
5  
 
The annual FDI has been about one billion USD in the 1990s. Many analysts claim that 
Turkey is under-performing relative to Central and East European Countries and other 
countries at the same level of development in attracting FDI (see, for example, Loewendahl 
and Ertugal-Loewendahl, 2000). However, an analysis of foreign firms’ share in Turkish 
manufacturing employment and value added suggests that FDI plays a substantial role in 
Turkish manufacturing industries.  
 
The share of foreign firms
6 in total number of private firms in the manufacturing industry was 
about 2.3 % in 1983, but it increased continuously up to 4.8 % in 1994 through acquisitions 
and entry.
7 There is a slight decline in the share in 1995 and 1996 that was caused by a rapid 
increase in the number of domestic firms (Figure 1). 
 
The share of foreign firms in private manufacturing employment was about 8.6 % with 45 
thousands people employed by foreign firms. Employment share of foreign firms increased 
gradually, especially after 1988, and reached 14.4 % in 1992. The number of employees in 
foreign firms dropped about 5 % from 1993 to 1996, but domestic firms secured more than 
20% increase that led to a decrease in the employment share of foreign firms in 1995 and 
1996. 
 
The share of foreign firms in the capital stock of the Turkish private manufacturing industry 
has followed a pattern similar to the employment share in the 1980s and 1990s, but it has been 
                                                 
4  For the data on inward FDI and the list of all firms with foreign equity participation, see the web site of the 
Undersecretariat of Treasury (http://www.hazine.gov.tr). 
5  The share of the manufacturing industry in total FDI was about 88% in 1977 (Öniş, 1994: 9).  
6  Following the usual convention, “foreign firms” are defined as those joint vetures where foreign ownership is 
10 % or more. If the foreign share is less than 10 %, it is considered to be portfolio investment. Joint ventures 
with more than 50% (90 %) foreign ownership are  “majority-owned foreign firms” (“wholly-owned foerign 
firms”).  
7  The data refers to all private establishments employing 25 or more people. The data source is the State 
Institute of Statistics (SIS) Longitudinal Database that includes all public and private establishments employing 
10 or more people. Since the data for ownership are not available for “small” (those employing 10-24 people) 
establishments for the whole period, they are not covered in our study. The statistical unit is the “establishment” 
which is the main decision-making unit. Most of the firms in Turkish manufacturing inddustries own only one 
establishment.   11 
considerably higher than the employment share because foreign firms tend to use more 
capital-intensive technologies. The share of foreign firms in capita stock was about 15 % in 
1983, but it exceeded 20 % in the early 1990s, followed by a few percentage points decline in 
the mid-1990s. 
 
Foreign firms are on average more productive than domestic firms. Consequently, their share 
in manufacturing value added is quite substantial. They produced about 15 % of value added 
in 1983, and increased their share continuously until 1993 (29 %). As observed in other 
variables, the value added share decreased slightly in 1994-96. Although the value added 
share of majority-owned foreign firms follows a similar pattern, there are interesting 
differences. Majority-owned foreign firms did not increase significantly their share in value 
added until 1987 (from 5.3 % in 1983 to 6.3 % in 1987). However, after the elimination of 
local equity participation and minimum export requirements in 1986 (Öniş, 1994: 96), 
majority-owned foreign firms realized a rapid growth in their valued added share throughout 
the period under consideration, and produced 20.6 % of manufacturing value added in 1996. 
In other words, all the expansion in value added share was achieved by majority-owned 
foreign firms, whereas minority-owned foreign firms (with equity participation within the 10-
50 % range) kept their shares almost constant around 8-10 % since the mid-1980s (see also 
Tatoglu and Glaister, 1998).
8  
 
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of domestic and foreign firms that were established 
after 1983. The variables in Table 1 are also used in the econometric analysis in the following 
section. Since we expect significant differences in entry characteristics, the same statistics are 
provided for entry year observations. Finally, since foreign firms are on average large than 
domestic firms, the data for “large” domestic firms are presented for comparison. 
 
As observed in many other countries, foreign firms in Turkey are characterized by 
•  larger size (in terms of the number of employees), 
•  use of more capital-intensive technologies, 
•  higher propensity to transfer technology from abroad, 
•  higher proportion of imported machinery in capital stock, 
•  R&D intensity, 
•  higher wages, 
•  lower proportion of the base wage in wage bill, 
                                                 
8  Cieslik and Ryan (2002) also found a similar shift from minority-owned joint ventures in the Central and 
Eastern Europe in favour of wholly-owned foreign firms.    12 
•  advertisement intensity, 
•  avoidance of subcontracting relations, 
•  higher interest payments, and 
•  higher profit rates. 
 
Moreover, although foreign firms are more likely to export (almost half of foreign firms 
export whereas the proportion of exporters among domestic firms is only 22 %), they tend to 
operate in import-competing (high ratio of import to apparent domestic consumption), and 
inward-oriented (low export intensity) sectors.  
 
It is interesting to observe the fact that most of these differences exist between foreign firms 
and large domestic firms. The most notable change is observed in the share of imported 
machinery and export behavior. In terms of these variables, there is not any significant 
different between foreign and large domestic firms. Moreover, the degree of foreign 
ownership seems to be not so important. There is no substantial difference between minority- 
and majority-owned foreign firms. 
 
The data on entry characteristics reveal that foreign and domestic firms start their lives 
differently, and entry-time differences seem to persist. Most importantly, foreign entrants are 
almost two times larger that domestic entrants (Hypothesis 1). As discussed in Introduction, 
the difference in entry size could be explained by real options theory and liquidity constraint. 
First, since foreign firms may have more information about their performance and, possibly, 
on market conditions as a result of their prior experience in other countries, the problem of 
sunk commitment could be less severe for foreign firms than domestic firms. Second, since 
foreign firms may have relatively abundant financial resources, and better access to external 
funding, they are not financially constrained. The fact that the interest payments/sales ratio is 
higher for foreign firms indicates that they easily raise external funding to finance their 
activities. 
 
Does ownership matter for survival? Figure 2 shows that the survival rates for foreign and 
domestic firms are different. 40 % of domestic firms cannot survive until age 6, whereas the 
same (hazard) rate for foreign firms is only 20 %.
9 As in the case of other variables, the 
survival rates for minority and majority-owned foreign firms are almost the same. Moreover, 
large domestic firms’ survival rates are comparable to those of foreign firms. This finding 
                                                 
9  The log-rank test rejects the equality of the survival functions for domestic and foreign firms at the 5 % level.   13 
points out that the firm size could be an important explanatory variable in explaining 
differences in survival rates. A comprehensive analysis of the factors that determine the 




4. Determinants of survival: An econometric analysis 
 
Our analysis shows that there are substantial (and statistically significant) differences between 
the survival rates of foreign and domestic firms in Turkish manufacturing industries. In order 
to test if foreign ownership matters for survival, we estimate a Cox proportional hazards 
model. 
 
The econometric analysis of survival is based on the estimation of the hazard function that 
defines the probability of exit in a certain time period as a function of a set of time-varying 
covariates, conditional on being survived until that time period. A functional form has to be 
assumed for the hazard function in the empirical implementation of the model. The Cox 
proportional hazards model is used frequently in empirical studies. The Cox model assumes a 
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where h0(t) is the baseline hazard function, X is a vector of explanatory variables, and β is a 
corresponding vector of regression coefficients. The β parameters are estimated by the 
maximization of the partial likelihood function that does not require the specification of 
h0(t)
10. 
The dependent variable is the time of exit. The exit time of those plants that survived until the 
end of 1996 is not observed (the longitudinal data for the period 1983 to 1996 were used in 
the analysis). Thus the distribution of the dependent variable is censored at year 1996. 
In the estimation of the Cox proportional hazard function, we use two sets of explanatory 
variables. The first set includes establishment-specific variables. The second set includes data 
                                                 
10  There are alternative models where the functional form of h0(t) is explicitly defined as a certain distribution 
(exponential, Weibull, etc.). We estimated our model with different distributional assumptions. Since the results 
were similar, we report only the Cox proportional hazards model results.   14 
about the characteristics of the industry defined at the 4-digit ISIC level in which the plant 
operates. This specification allows us to infer the plant- and sector-specific characteristics that 
determine the survival process. 
 
One of the main purposes of this paper is to test if foreign establishments have different 
survival probabilities. We use a continuous variable, the share of foreign ownership (FDI), to 
test this hypothesis (Hypothesis 2). We also experimented with dummy variables for 




Almost all empirical studies on survival find that the establishment size is one of the main 
determinants of survival (or hazard) probabilities (see Agarwal and Audretsch, 2001, and 
references therein). Therefore, we use the (log) number of employees to test the impact of size 
on survival (the LL variable). The average annual growth rate of the establishment since the 
entry year (LGR) is used to check if active learning, as proxied by growth, plays a role in 
determining the survival probability (Mata, Portugal, Guimarães, 1995). The interactions of 
these two variables with the FDI variable (LL*FDI, and LGR*FDI) are added into the model to 
check if the effects of size and learning (Hypothesis 3) differ between domestic and foreign 
firms. 
 
The fourth hypothesis suggests that the foreign presence will reduce domestic establishments’ 
survival probability because of intensified competition. The market share
12 of foreign firms, 
FDIMSH, is added into the model to test this hypothesis, whereas its interaction with the FDI 
variable (FDIMSH*FDI) is used to test the next hypothesis. 
 
The following variables are also added into the Cox proportional hazard model to incorporate 
the effects of establishment- and industry-level characteristics.  
 
KL is defined as the (log) capital/labor ratio where “capital” is calculated by the perpetual 
inventory method at the establishment level, and “labor” is measured by the number of 
employees. It is used to capture the effect of capital intensity of survival probability. 
ADVERINT (the advertisement expenditures/sales ratio), SUBINPUT (the share of subcontracted 
                                                 
11  Estimation results for models with FDI dummy variables are available from the authors upon request. 
12  The “market” is defined at the ISIC 4-digit level (Rev. 2).   15 
inputs in total inputs) and SUBOUTPUT (the share of output subcontracted by other firms in 
total output) are proxies for product and process characteristics. Advertisement will be higher 
for those products where “brand image” or reputation is important. Advertisement intensity 
may lead to rapid growth. Moreover, investment in advertisement is a sunk cost that cannot be 
recovered in other activities. Thus, exit will be less likely for advertisement intensive firms. 
Subcontracting can improve firms’ flexibility and reduce exit costs, i.e., SUPINPUT and 
SUBOUTPUT variables may have a positive impact on hazard rates. The data for exporting firms 
are available since 1990. Therefore, we use a dummy variable for exporters, EXPDUM, to test 
if export-oriented firms have higher survival probability in the period 1990-95. 
 
There are three variables regarding the technological level of the establishments: TECHTRAN (a 
dummy variables that takes value 1 if the establishment acquired a foreign technology through 
licensing, know how agreements, etc.), RDINT (R&D intensity, the R&D expenditures/sales 
ratio), and IMPMACH (the share of imported machinery in fixed capital stock). These variables 
measure various aspects of technological capability: TECHTRAN and IMPMACH reflect imported 
disembodied and embodied technology, respectively, whereas RDINT is a measure of in-house 
innovative capability. All these three variables are expected to have a positive impact on 
survival probability because technologically advanced establishments are expected to have 
better prospects in the future. (The RDINT and IMPMACH variables are available only since 
1990.) 
 
There are four variables about the financial aspects of the conduct of the establishments: 
INTPAY (the ratio of interest payments to sales revenue), PMARGIN (the profit margin, profits 
before taxes divided by sales revenue), PRSHARE (“profit sharing”, the proportion of non-wage 
payments to workers in total payments for labor), and LW (the log wage rate). Ceteris paribus, 
higher interest payments means bigger financial burden on the establishment, i.e., higher 
hazard probability. PMARGIN will have the opposite effect: profitable establishments are more 
likely to survive. The wage rate (LW) measures the skill level: higher the skill level, higher the 
survival probability. PRSHARE is more difficult to interpret. Firms may tend to offer higher 
non-wage payments to boost labor flexibility (by lowering severance payments) and to share 
risks with their workers. Therefore, higher value of the PRSHARE variable may associate with 
higher hazard probability. 
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Finally, there are six industry-level variables. The entry rate (ENTRATE, the proportion of 
entrants in the industry) is related with the level of competition. An increase in the entry rate 
will lead to stiffer competition that will eventually reduce the survival probability. IMPENET 
and EXPINT are import intensity (the ratio between imports and apparent consumption), and 
export intensity (the ratio between exports and domestic output).  These two variables are 
used to capture the effects of international competition on the survival probabilities. SECTGR 
and SECTGRPR are annual growth rates of real industrial output and output prices (at the 
industry level). These two variables are related with market prospects, and expected to have a 
positive impact on survival probability. 
 
Cox proportional hazard model estimates are presented in Table 2 (columns 1-3). All models 
are stratified by ISIC 4-digit industries because the underlying hazard functions could be 
industry-specific. All models also include time-dummies to take into account the effects of the 
business cycles and other shocks on hazard rates. Hazard ratios presented in the table indicate 
the effect of the variable on hazard probability. A coefficient larger than 1 indicates that the 
variable increases (decreases) the hazard (survival) probability, whereas a coefficient smaller 
than 1 has the opposite effect.  
 
The first model in Table 2 is estimated by using all observations, i.e., all establishments that 
exist in the period 1983-95. Since there is no information about the entry time and entry 
characteristics of those establishments that are observed the first time in the 1983 database, 
the growth rate (LGR) variable for those establishments is calculated as if they were 
established in 1983, and a dummy variable for these establishments are included into the 
model. The second model is estimated by using the data for all entrants for the period 1984-
95, i.e., for those establishments that enter into the database after 1983. Finally, the third 
model is estimated for all entrants for the period 1990-95 to be able to use three additional 
explanatory variables, EXPDUM, RDINT, and IMPMACH, that are available only for that period. 
 
All three models offer similar results: the establishment size and the growth rate are major 
determinants of survival. Large and rapidly growing establishments are less likely to exit from 
the market. In all three models, the presence of foreign establishments does not have any 
impact on hazard rates. Foreign establishments make life for others neither more difficult 
(through stiff competition), nor easier (through spillovers). This result is quite interesting 
because, for example, De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003) have found at the industry level that   17 
even in a developed country like Belgium, import competition and FDI stimulate exit of 
domestic firms, and discourage entry by domestic entrepreneurs. 
 
In all three models, foreign ownership does not matter for survival. Neither the foreign 
ownership variable itself, nor its interactions with size, growth, and foreign presence have any 
impact on hazard probabilities. (The interaction between LGR and FDI variables is barely 
significant in the third model.) The joint significance of four foreign ownership variables (FDI, 
LL*FDI, LLGR*FDI, and FDIMSH*FDI) is also rejected by the log likelihood test in all survival 
models (see the FDI test statistics in Table 2).  
 
Technologically advanced (the TECHTRAN, and IMPMACH variables), export-oriented (the 
EXPDUM variable) and skill-labor using (the LW variable) establishments have higher survival 
probabilities. All financial variables (INTPAY, PMARGIN, and PRSHARE) have the expected 
impact on hazard probabilities. Capital-intensive establishments and subcontractors find it 
easier to exit, whereas rapid growth in real industrial output and output prices improve 
survival prospects. Establishments operating in import competing industries have higher 
survival probabilities. This finding bears a resemblance to the so-called import discipline 
hypothesis.  
 
Although it is not the main focus of our paper, we also estimate the growth equations for all 
entrants. The employment growth rate is defined as 
 
gt = (Lt - Lt-1)/Lt-1 
 
where Lt is the number of employees at time t. If the firm exits at time t, the employment 
growth rate will be equal to –1. Since the dependent variable is censored at –1, we use the 
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where αi’s are random establishment-specific effects. 
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All explanatory variables are the same as in the survival model with only one exception. 
Instead of the average growth rate variable, LGR, we use the (log) age of the establishment 
(LAGE) because previous studies show that establishment size is one of the main determinants 
of growth rates. 
 
As may be expected, the estimation results of the growth model are somewhat similar to the 
estimation results of the survival model though there are some interesting differences. 
 
The size of the establishment has a weak positive impact on the growth rate, because small 
establishments, as found before, are more likely to exit (however, this impact is not 
statistically significant in the period 1984-95, providing a weak support for the Gibrat’s law). 
Establishment age has a negative impact on the growth rate, i.e., young establishments, ceteris 
paribus, grow faster. But this relationship does not receive any support from the data for the 
shorter time period (1990-95). 
 
The presence of foreign establishments does not have any impact on the growth rates of 
domestic and foreign establishments alike (the coefficients of the FDIMSH and FDIMSH*FDI 
variables are statistically insignificant). Foreign establishments have higher growth rates than 
domestic establishments: the coefficient of the FDI variable is positive and statistically 
significant for both time periods.
13 However, this impact gets smaller for large and/or old 
foreign establishments (negative coefficients for the LL*FDI and LAGE*FDI variables). In other 
words, although foreign establishments start large compared to the domestic establishments, 
they are nevertheless small compared to their “optimal” size, and, hence, achieve growth rates 
faster that domestic establishments or large/old foreign establishments do. These results show 
that foreign firms, although they are in a better financial position, and have prior experience, 
are cautious in entering a foreign market, and tend to grow rapidly after gathering information 
on market conditions and its performance. Foreign firms could achieve faster growth rates 
especially in the early post-entry period because they are not financially constrained as a 
result of higher profit rates and access to external funds.
14 These results support hypotheses 6 
and 7. 
 
                                                 
13  The joint significance of the FDI variables is not rejected at the 5 % level for the period 1984-95 and at the 
11% level for the priod 1990-95. 
14  Mata and Portugal (2002) and Blonigen and Tomlin (2001) also find that foreign firms achieve faster growth 




In this paper, we analyze the impact of foreign direct investment on the dynamics of foreign 
and domestic establishments, i.e., entry, selection (exit), and growth processes. We obtain 
three main conclusions on the basis of our analysis on foreign and domestic establishments in 
Turkish manufacturing industry for the period 1983-96: 
 
First, there are significant differences between entry characteristics of foreign and local firms. 
Most importantly, foreign entrants are almost two times larger that domestic entrants. At the 
time of entry, foreign firms use more capital intensive technologies, pay higher wages, have 
better access to formal sources of funding, are more profitable, and have a stronger tendency 
to export relative to domestic firms. 
 
Second, entry-level differences persist after entry, and foreign firms are more likely to 
survive. In other words, a large proportion of domestic firms go bankrupt in a few years, 
whereas the exit rate is much lower for foreign firms. 
 
Third, although foreign firms are less likely to go bankrupt, neither foreign ownership itself 
nor foreign presence in the market matter for survival. What matters is other firm-
characteristics such as the size of the firm, the growth rate of the firm, the cost of external 
funding, profitability, quality of the labor force, etc. In other words, foreign firms are less 
likely to go bankrupt not because of their foreign ownership, but because of their (initial) size 
and other characteristics. However, foreign firms, even after controlling for other 
characteristics, seem to achieve higher growth rate in their early years. 
 
Policy implications of our findings can be summarized as follows: 
 
First, the foreign ownership and the presence of foreign firms in the market do not have any 
impact on the survival of domestic (and foreign) firms. Therefore, i) there is no need to fear 
that foreign firms impose an unduly pressure on domestic firms, and ii) there is no need to 
expect positive gains from FDI in the form of better passive learning. In other words, the 
enterprise policy should be ownership-neutral. 
 
Second, there are considerable differences between entry characteristics of foreign and 
domestic firms, and these differences are persistent, and determine the post-entry performance 
and survival probability. Entry characteristics are extremely important for the performance of 
firms, the efficiency of the competition process, and, the performance of the economy. 
Therefore, the enterprise policy should aim at influencing entry characteristics through 
focusing on training of entrepreneurs, providing managerial and technical information, 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics (mean values)
Label Description
Domestic Large Foreign Foreign Domestic Large Foreign Foreign
domestic 10%+ 50%+ domestic 10%+ 50%+
Establishment-level variables
LL Log number of employees 3.965 5.634 4.886 4.802 3.725 5.622 4.498 4.347
L Number of employees 53 280 132 122 41 276 90 77
FDI Share of foreign ownership 0.000 0.001 0.614 0.777 0.000 0.001 0.626 0.761
LLGR Annual employment growth rate  0.049 0.140 0.072 0.073
KL Log capital/labor ratio 3.438 3.818 4.329 4.376 3.656 4.083 4.221 4.208
ADVERINT Advertisement/sales ratio 0.003 0.005 0.010 0.011 0.003 0.005 0.012 0.013
SUBINPUT Subcontracted input share 0.034 0.042 0.026 0.026 0.032 0.024 0.029 0.030
SUBOUTPUTSubcontracted output share 0.077 0.064 0.051 0.056 0.097 0.087 0.058 0.065
TECHTRAN Technology transfer dummy 0.010 0.041 0.189 0.214 0.006 0.041 0.131 0.131
INTPAY Interest payments/sales ratio 0.025 0.050 0.054 0.048 0.020 0.055 0.070 0.060
PMARGIN Profit margin 0.139 0.185 0.236 0.255 0.132 0.170 0.191 0.184
PRSHARE Share of non-wage payments in wage bill 0.076 0.158 0.190 0.190 0.059 0.169 0.169 0.165
LW Log wage rate 1.997 2.376 2.926 3.044 1.885 2.337 2.737 2.843
IMPMACH Share of imported machinery 0.116 0.249 0.256 0.258 0.098 0.216 0.191 0.187
RDINT R&D/sales ratio (*100) 0.082 0.116 0.155 0.166 0.063 0.062 0.083 0.076
EXPDUM Exporter dummy 0.220 0.447 0.462 0.485 0.168 0.342 0.402 0.421
Sector-level (ISIC +-digit level) variables
FDIMSH Market share of foreign establishments 0.106 0.097 0.185 0.188 0.096 0.091 0.161 0.163
ENTRATE Entry rate 0.065 0.063 0.057 0.057 0.081 0.091 0.087 0.081
IMPENET Import penetration 0.149 0.115 0.197 0.179 0.144 0.111 0.178 0.165
EXPINT Export intensity 0.328 0.365 0.275 0.264 0.344 0.324 0.297 0.304
SECTGR Output growth rate 0.104 0.118 0.116 0.106 0.142 0.196 0.164 0.153
SECTGRPR Growth rate of output price 0.532 0.546 0.545 0.562 0.490 0.482 0.491 0.512
Number of observations (1983-96) 33284 3217 1237 791 8094 389 236 160
Number of observations (1990-96) 21412 2369 917 625 3985 196 122 95
Note: "Large domestic" establishments employ 150 or more employees.
mimprat, rdint, and expdum variables are available for 1990-96.
All observations Entry year observations
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Table 2. Survival and growth models estimation results
Haz. Rat. Std. Err. Haz. Rat. Std. Err. Haz. Rat. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
LL 0.484 0.015 ** 0.495 0.022 ** 0.500 0.031 ** 0.007 0.008 0.020 0.007 **
LGR 0.151 0.025 ** 0.222 0.043 ** 0.141 0.038 **
LAGE -0.076 0.007 ** 0.004 0.006
FDI 0.302 0.232 0.381 0.383 2.683 3.408 0.631 0.161 ** 0.259 0.151 *
LL*FDI 1.319 0.227 1.197 0.284 0.764 0.230 -0.106 0.035 ** -0.045 0.033
LAGE*FDI -0.074 0.039 * -0.081 0.046 *
LGR*FDI 1.184 1.388 2.395 2.614 12.617 18.752 *
FDIMSH 0.918 0.172 0.907 0.206 0.824 0.304 0.032 0.028 0.025 0.027
FDIMSH*FDI 1.060 1.032 1.106 1.228 0.730 1.009 0.028 0.171 0.138 0.155
KL 1.103 0.012 ** 1.125 0.017 ** 1.013 0.024 0.034 0.005 ** 0.026 0.004 **
ADVERINT 0.147 0.177 0.385 0.533 0.601 1.162 0.586 0.260 ** 0.768 0.294 **
SUBINPUT 1.071 0.178 1.123 0.205 1.077 0.325 0.051 0.047 0.164 0.058 **
SUBOUTPUT 1.248 0.065 ** 1.270 0.076 ** 1.028 0.184 -0.050 0.018 ** 0.030 0.038
TECHTRAN 0.756 0.113 * 0.759 0.170 1.025 0.261 0.004 0.032 -0.027 0.032
INTPAY 3.892 0.560 ** 2.792 0.570 ** 2.811 0.958 ** -0.255 0.057 ** -0.254 0.069 **
PMARGIN 0.769 0.015 ** 0.791 0.018 ** 0.801 0.033 ** 0.090 0.010 ** 0.091 0.013 **
PRSHARE 2.448 0.339 ** 1.850 0.340 ** 2.535 0.662 ** -0.169 0.042 ** -0.249 0.048 **
LW 0.673 0.021 ** 0.730 0.028 ** 0.819 0.047 ** 0.106 0.008 ** 0.055 0.010 **
ENTRATE 0.988 0.397 0.586 0.287 0.955 0.763 0.075 0.080 0.055 0.103
IMPENET 0.472 0.134 ** 0.488 0.180 * 1.455 1.360 -0.018 0.027 0.027 0.027
EXPINT 1.004 0.085 0.946 0.106 1.008 0.322 0.090 0.013 ** 0.023 0.014 *
SECTGR 0.949 0.040 0.913 0.046 * 0.867 0.069 * 0.018 0.009 * 0.026 0.012 **
SECTGRPR 0.477 0.066 ** 0.609 0.096 ** 0.506 0.105 ** 0.130 0.030 ** 0.140 0.034 **
IMPMACH 0.652 0.104 ** 0.153 0.024 **
RDINT 0.954 0.032 0.006 0.005
EXPDUM 0.631 0.043 ** 0.060 0.010 **
# observations 60603 29744 18131 28704 17511
# firms 11181 7404 5469 7346 5401
# exits 5670 3631 1867 3631 1867
Wald test, χ
2 1970 ** 921 ** 715 ** 790 ** 519 **
FDI test, χ
2
(4) 2.27 2.14 2.04 20.56 ** 7.61 +
Log likelihood -27192 -16851 -7239 -24885 -14252
** (*) means statistically significant at 5% (10%) level. Robust standard errors in brackets. Hazard models are stratified by ISIC 4-digit industries.
All models include time dummies. The first model includes a dummy variable for incumbents in 1983.
1990-95, all entrants
Cox proportional hazard model  Employment growth model
1983-95, all estab. 1984-95, all entrants 1990-95, all entrants 1984-95, all entrants
 